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Introduction 
 
In the spring of 2014 Europe had a rude awakening, whilst Ukrainians were celebrating the end 
of the Yanukovych Presidency, ‘Little Green Men’ showed up in Crimea. Together, with local 
actors, Russian soldiers isolated and seized the peninsula. The official statement was that these 
soldiers were merely ‘volunteers’ who were defending their fellow Russians. What was 
remarkable, and a sign that these ‘volunteers’ were Russian regular soldiers, was their polite 
and professional behaviour towards the Crimean population.1 The seizure, and subsequent 
annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia was soon followed by reports of ‘separatist’ 
activity in Eastern Ukraine. While most protests were quickly quelled, in the oblasts of Donetsk 
and Luhansk the ‘separatists’ gained a foothold. In this case as well, official statements by the 
Kremlin denied any involvement. However, the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17, and 
the ‘separatist’ counter attack during August of 2014, this official denial became untenable. In 
the space of several months, Russian forces and their local allies upended the status quo that 
existed in Europe after the end of the Cold War.  Reactions to the annexation, and the 
subsequent violence was denounced by a majority Western commentators and politicians alike, 
who professed both shock, and surprise. The shock about Russian actions was so great that 
Poland and the Baltic States invoked Article 4 of the NATO treaty, in response to Russian 
aggression.2 Amid tensions and opaque machinations, was the invocation of Article 4 
hyperbole, or justified? 
 The research question will look into this dynamic. Is there a security dilemma between 
Russia and the West regarding the Baltic States? At first glance, this could arguably be called 
premature. Why would Putin risk a war with NATO? Russia has in recent years seen its 
economic growth seriously contracted, making it harder to maintain military spending.3 Its 
population growth, while experiencing a slow recovery in recent years, has known a steadily 
decline ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union.4 Russia is also a signatory to the NATO 
Russia Founding Act of 1997 wherein both parties agree to let sovereign states arrange their 
own security.5 On the other side of the argument we have statements by Putin that that the 
collapse of the Soviet Union has been ‘the greatest geopolitical disaster in the twentieth 
                                                          
1 Vice News, ‘Russia's Little Green Men Enter Ukraine: Russian Roulette in Ukraine (Dispatch 1)’, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TNKsLlK52ss.  
2 Rettman, ‘Nato reassures Poland, Baltic states on Russia threat’  
3 http://www.tradingeconomics.com/russia/gdp-growth-annual. 
4 http://www.tradingeconomics.com/russia/population/forecast. 
5 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation. 
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century’.6 The Russian rhetoric even heated up after the annexation of Crimea when President 
Putin proclaimed that large parts of Ukraine would be absorbed in Novorossiya, a term 
harkening back to the days of the Czars.7 The project has since been abandoned or put on a low 
pitch. In addition to the rhetoric espoused by the Kremlin, there is also the matter of steady 
military build-up that took place after the war with Georgia in 2008. The improvements of the 
Russian armed forces, combined with frequent military provocations in the form SNAP 
exercises, and infringements of foreign airspace, can arguably lead to a justified sense of dread. 
These developments need further study. 
 This brings us to the framework of this thesis, in it, the attempt is made to find a balance 
between the Copenhagen School notion of securitisation and discourse on the one hand8, and 
how this discourse can be augmented by physical assets. To clarify, if in a hypothetical situation 
the leader of country A, threatens country B with some form of violence, this is threat in of 
itself is meaningless unless there are means to back up the threat. In a reversed situation, when 
country B feels threatened by country A, these feelings of fear require clear image to fear, i.e. 
country A’s military arsenal. To make this more concrete, when Putin stated in 2005 that the 
collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical disaster of the twentieth century, this 
could arguably give the governments of Baltic states cause for concern. Three years after this 
statement was made, Russian military forces invaded Georgia in a show of force, with the end 
result that two Georgian provinces, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, were put firmly in the Russian 
sphere of influence. If this was an isolated event, a discourse of Baltic security vis-à-vis Russian 
threats would arguably seem overdrawn, the events of 2014 in Ukraine showed that Russian 
military aggression in Georgia was not a fluke. In addition to Russian military action, the 
Russian armed forces have seen a steady increase in allocated funds for the past eight years.9 
Making it one of the most formidable militaries in Europe. What is striking about these 
investments is that it combines the Soviet notion of quantity, which is supplemented by new, 
more technological sophisticated weaponry. This development is increasing Baltic feelings of 
insecurity. 
The arguments presented in this thesis are based on literary research. The main 
theoretical basis is provided by academic articles and non-academic articles. These articles are 
written by scholars from American, European, Russian academia, and policy institutes like the 
                                                          
6 ‘Putin deplores collapse of USSR’ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4480745.stm.  
7 ‘‘Novorossiya’ Falls from Putin’s Vocabulary as Ukraine Crisis Drags’ 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/novorossiya-falls-from-putins-vocabulary-as-ukraine-crisis-drags-1432936655.  
8 Wæver, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’ (1993). 
9 Nichol. ‘Russian military reform and defense policy.’, 263. 
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RAND corporation, and the Dutch Clingendael institute. Part of the literature is concerned with 
the development of Russian foreign policy. The second part of the literature deals with the way 
Russian foreign policy is put into practice, and the possible responses to those policies. Further 
sources are in large part provided by public speeches made by President Putin, these provide 
the raw material for researching the Russian rhetoric. The arguments presented in this thesis 
will provide an answer on the nature of the security dilemma between Russia and the West, and 
how this situation came into existence. In this thesis, some broad terms are used to determine 
the respective parties. When terms like; Russia, or the Kremlin are used, these refer to the 
Russian government, and more specifically to the Putinist regime currently ruling Russia. When 
the broad term ‘the West’ is used it refers to the combination of the United States, the European 
Union, and NATO. When specific policies, or responses are discussed, their place of origin, 
US, EU, or NATO will all be separately mentioned.  
 
 
1. Methodology and theory 
 
In this chapter, the methodology used for this thesis is expanded upon, and why the case in 
point, a possible security dilemma in the Baltics, is used as an example. The main methodology 
used for this purpose is Political Discourse Analysis (PDA) as laid out by Isabella and Norman 
Fairclough.10 PDA is similar of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), but instead of looking at 
discourse as power, it looks to discern political discourse as argumentation and more 
specifically, practical argumentation. Simply put, it looks as to how policy decisions come into 
being. Actions are followed by deliberation in which decisions are made about what is right and 
wrong in a situation of uncertainty and human infallibility.11 
 While both approaches are similar, for the purposes of this thesis PDA will be the more 
appropriate to use. Conventional Critical Discourse Analysis, in the tradition of Michel 
Foucault, looks to discover how language, or discourse can be used to reinforce power 
structures.12 However, this will not be the focus of this thesis. One of main focal points is to 
dissect the rhetoric and focus on the impact it has on policy decisions, and the material power 
that rests behind it. In addition to this, it can be argued that the rhetoric used by both the Kremlin 
and by Western leaders may be utterances that reinforces insecurity, rather than power. 
                                                          
10 Fairclough and Fairclough, Political Discourse Analysis: A method for advanced students (Routledge 2012). 
11 Fairclough and Fairclough, Political Discourse Analysis, 17-18. 
12 Foucault, 'Politics and the study of discourse', 53-72. 
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 Furthermore, the PDA approach is useful, because it can be argued that a security 
dilemma can be created through policy decisions. Although it must be stressed that this does 
not mean that there is a strict causal relation between decisions made in the past, and the current 
situation in Eastern Europe. What this does do, is assist us with in a way in finding out how 
rhetoric might be a way for policy to be communicated across the boundaries. Also, some policy 
decisions taken, can also act as an accelerant for escalating a policy decision cycle. Simply put, 
a perceived threat, or a perceived weakness might trigger blowback. Analysing those decisions 
might help us understand that process. The rhetoric used by Russian and Western policymakers 
will be contrasted against their actions, and how they interact with one another.  
 The main theoretical underpinning of this thesis is, as mentioned before, that of 
securitisation.13 The interesting point about this theory as explained by Wæver and others, is 
that takes a post-modern approach to security. Primarily that a discourse about security can 
enforce a reality. To specify this to Russian foreign policy, when NATO is seen as the primary 
adversary, every action by the alliance, such stationing military units Eastern Europe to reassure 
allies and deter possible military actions, can be viewed as a threat to Russian security concerns. 
Or as Sergey Karaganov, head of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, puts it in an 
interview with Der Spiegel, 
 
‘Now, fears in countries like Poland, Lithuania and Latvia are to be allayed by NATO stationing 
weapons there. But that doesn't help them; we interpret that as a provocation. In a crisis, we 
will destroy exactly these weapons. Russia will never again fight on its own territory…’14 
 
It must be stressed though that this securitisation debate in this case is not sole a Russian 
purview. In response to Russian actions taken in Ukraine, and the several large military 
exercises in the Russian Western Military District, a securitisation debate is taking place in the 
West. One outcome of this debate were the NATO Summits of 2014, and 2016 which were 
explicitly concerned with coming up with a response to Russian military aggression.15 
 Therein lies also a weakness for the securitisation theory. If two narratives are put beside 
each other, and are then argued to be a discourse, then we might arguably state a false 
equivalency about the two narratives. While the Russian narrative in regard to the West, is 
arguably a constructed view of the world. Western concerns about Russian behaviour are 
                                                          
13 Wæver, "Securitization and Desecuritization.". 
14 Neef, ‘Russian Foreign Policy: 'We Are Smarter, Stronger and More Determined'’.  
15 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm.  
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arguably justified and a response to Russian aggression. In other words, we must discern fact 
from bullshit, as Harry Frankfurt put in his article On Bullshit.16 While it can be argued that the 
current security situation is a construct, this construct has implications in the real world. 
 How did this construct came into being? It can be argued that President Putin’s notion 
that the collapse of the Soviet as one of the greatest geopolitical disasters of the twentieth 
century is not without merit.17 If we view the collapse of the Soviet Union as a collapse of an 
imperial power, Putin’s argument is understandable. Decolonisation can be a traumatic 
experience, for both the coloniser, and the colonised. The example of how France fought two 
destructive wars in Algeria and Indochina reminds us, shows that this can be the case. However, 
how both parties interact with one another after the dust has settled can do much to normalise 
relations between the two. 
 For much of the past twenty-six years, it seemed that new geopolitical situation in 
Central and Eastern Europe was a fait accompli. Which was reinforced by several treaties 
signed in the first decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Treaties like the Budapest 
Memorandum18 and the NATO-Russia Founding Act19 in 1994, and 1997 respectively. Even the 
advent of President Putin as prime minister, and later as president, gave no indication of major 
shifts in Russian foreign policy behaviour. While there were tensions in the way NATO 
resolved the several Balkan conflicts, one would have to be clairvoyant, or extremely 
pessimistic to predict the current security situation in Europe. 
 Yet, in 2008 with the five-day war against Georgia, and the annexation of Crimea and 
starting a war in Donbas in 2014, Western governments were confronted by a Russia, willing 
to bare its teeth to gain a geopolitical advantage. The timing of these actions are arguably well 
planned. Russia, having invested heavily in upgrading its armed forces, giving it a comparative 
advantage militarily. This development caught European governments on a vulnerable moment, 
which issued condemnatory declarations, but lacked substantial tools, save economic sanctions, 
to give teeth to those condemnations. Due to systemic defence budget cuts in the past twenty-
six years. Undeterred, Russian sabre rattling has continued unabated.    
 
 
 
                                                          
16 Frankfurt, On Bullshit, 8-9. 
17 ‘Putin deplores collapse of USSR’ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4480745.stm.  
18 Budapest Memorandums on Security Assurances, 1994.  
19 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm. 
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2. Security in Discourse 
 
What is security, and how can it be a dilemma? In the past sixty years this question has been a 
subject of considerable interests among scholars of International Relations. One of first to 
discuss the notion of security and were John Herz, and Arnold Wolfers.20 Their concern for this 
concept was brought to the fore due to the Cold War and the subsequent arms build-up, and 
what this might lead to. The security dilemma, as a theoretical concept, was a topic that was for 
a long time the purveyance of Realist scholars. Which in itself was not surprising.  
 In his article, Uncertain about Uncertainty: Understanding the Multiple Meanings of a 
Crucial Concept in International Relations Theory,21 Brian Rathbun describes how security is 
described within the different schools of thought within IR. One interesting observation 
Rathbun makes about Realism and security, is that the notion of security is intertwined with 
fear, and ignorance. More precisely, ignorance of the motives of the other party, breeds more 
insecurity. This then, will inevitably lead to Catch-22 like situation wherein a lack of knowledge 
leads to fear over the motives of others, while at the same time it is impossible to know all.22 
 As mentioned above, the conceptualisation of the security dilemma came about during 
the Cold War. It was also arguably influenced by other ideas in the social sciences, one of the 
more influential was arguably that of Game Theory. Important scholars like Robert Jervis, often 
describe a security dilemma as a zero-sum game. Wherein one wins or loses, and losing possibly 
entailing ultimate destruction.23 We know from history that is preposition is arguably an 
overdrawn theory. It is arguably a product of its time, the Cold War ushered in a new period in 
human history. It being the first time in history when men had the capability to destroy the 
world in a nuclear conflict. 
 There is an argument to be made that although the idea of the security dilemma is a 
product of its time, it can provide us with a useful framework in this case study. The current 
relations between Russia, and the West are arguably strained due to the fact that there two 
different systems facing each other. This is not suggesting that there is an ideological difference 
as it was during the Cold War, but as British scholar, and former diplomat Robert Cooper argued 
in his book The post-modern state and the world order24 the West, and more specifically the 
                                                          
20 Herz, ‘Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma’ and Wolfers, ‘"National Security" as an 
Ambiguous Symbol’. 
21 Rathbun, ‘Uncertain about Uncertainty: Understanding the Multiple Meanings of a Crucial Concept, 533–557. 
22 Rathbun, ‘Uncertain about Uncertainty’, 538-541. 
23 Jervis, ‘Cooperation under the Security Dilemma’, 167-170. 
24 Cooper, The post-modern state and the world order (London 2000). 
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European Union could arguably be described as post-modern state which is characterised by 
interdependence, transparency and mutual vulnerability. In this environment a group of 
countries seek to solve crises without the use of force, which for the ‘modern’ state is an 
acceptable method to settle disputes.25 In this line of reasoning, Vladimir Putin’s Russia can 
arguably be described as a relic of modernity, which has trouble adjusting to the post-Cold War 
status quo, and using the ‘modern’ state’s tools to destabilise the post-modern order in Europe.  
 This difference between the ‘modern’ and the ‘post-modern’ state is also visible in 
European foreign policy. The EU foreign policy is primarily centred on exporting its own 
internal model of mutual dependence, cooperation to its periphery.26 The EU is in this sense an 
exporter of an arguably successful model of governance. In contrast to this, Russian foreign 
policy is arguably based on its postcolonial Soviet legacy. Viewing the former the Soviet 
republics as their Near Abroad, and seeing their independence as anomaly. This has been 
described as ‘Robison Crusoe and Friday’ relationship.27 Within this context, Russian insistence 
on perceived NATO aggression is arguably understandable, requiring a response to safeguard 
its own sovereignty.  
 Another way to look at the security dilemma is brought to the academic discourse by 
the adherents of the Copenhagen School, Ole Wæver being one of the most prominent among 
them.28 Whereas (Neo-)Realist IR scholars primarily focus on security being measured in 
quantative units, knowledge, missiles, gross domestic product, Ole Wæver and others from the 
Copenhagen School tend to focus on how the term security could be used to frame a discourse. 
This is in itself an interesting notion to view the matter of security matters. 
 The term Wæver uses in this context is securitisation, the framework of this term is 
usually centred on how the discussion about security, which can entail viewing every issue as 
a security issue. A number of security concepts that are used today, like human security, or 
economic security etc. are part of this discussion and can therefore devoid the word security of 
its meaning.29 Like the first discourses about the security dilemma, securitisation is also a 
product of its time. Serious academic discussion about securitisation, as a response to new 
notions of security, really took off after the fall of the Berlin Wall.  
                                                          
25 Cooper, The post-modern state, 19-23. 
26 Barbé, Herranz-Surrallés, and Natorski. ‘Model, player or instrument for global governance: metaphors in the 
discourse and practice of EU foreign policy.’, 117-119. 
27 Ryabchuk, ‘The Ukrainian “Friday” and Russian “Robinson”. The Uneasy Advent of 
Postcoloniality’, 10-13. 
28 Wæver, Securitization and Desecuritization. 
29 Ibid. 
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With the end of the threat coming from the Soviet Union, which Francis Fukuyama 
dubbed as the End of History,30 supposedly ended the forty-five years of super power politics. 
Western policy makers, lacking a clear threat, focused on other issues as security related. Terms 
like humanitarian intervention, and human security entered the discourse. A comprehensive 
discourse about security was started, to which the Copenhagen School responded. In relation to 
the security dilemma, the Copenhagen School offers an interesting way of viewing of what a 
security dilemma is. These critiques offer insights how security can become a dilemma. 
When discussing a topic as current as this, academic papers provide the theoretical 
framework, but in addition to current literature, it is also useful to look to historical authors, in 
particular to Thucydides and his seminal work The History of the Peloponnesian War.31 His 
work provides us with arguably the first recorded security dilemma between the Athenians and 
their allies, and the Spartans and their allies. What is also valuable about Thucydides’ work is 
that he wrote dispassionately about how power politics was implemented in real life. He also 
implied that power politics, and its companion hubris could have grave consequences. 
Historical sources add also another aspect in examining current affairs. It could be argued that 
states, or other polities, pursue their interests in way that does not change through time. It can 
arguably be boiled down to Thucydides maxim of might makes right. Using this maxim though, 
is problematic. It forgets the context of the situation described, and the consequences it had for 
the parties involved. In the Athenian case, their might makes right attitude in the Peloponnesian 
War brought most of the city states of Greece in arms against them, bringing about its downfall.  
Another valuable source of information is the wide variety of policy papers written in 
the last three years, and these publications gained traction after the annexation of the Crimea. 
The Dutch policy institute Clingendael has published a number of policy papers that are 
concerned with responses should be undertaken by the EU in countering Russian policies.32 In 
addition to these policy papers, there are also papers authored with a more NATO themed 
approach, most of these have an American, or sometimes Baltic footprint through them. In that, 
they are less inclined to nuance and offer strict guidelines of how to act.33 Another good source 
of information are articles posted in selected newspapers and magazines like Foreign Affairs 
and Foreign Policy. Both these magazines, and newspapers feature articles that give an insight 
                                                          
30 Fukuyama, The end of history?, 3-18. 
31 Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian Wars. 
32 Drent, Landman & Zandee, A New Strategy – Implications for CSDP (Clingendael 2016), Bakker, Anne, 
Drent, Landman & Zandee, A Stronger CSDP: Deepening Defence Cooperation (Clingendael 2016). 
33 Clark, Luik, Ramms, Shirref, Closing NATO’s Baltic Gap (2016), and Philip M. Breedlove, ‘NATO's Next 
Act: How to Handle Russia and Other Threats’, 96-105. 
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into both Russian foreign policy, and Western responses from an arguably more practical point 
of view. 
An important angle of research will be looking into the role that rhetoric plays within 
the discourse of a security dilemma. One author who involves himself with this subject is the 
London based Ukrainian writer and journalist, Pomerantsev argued that the blurring of truth 
has led to a post-fact age.34 This idea of post-fact is an arguably interesting angle to view 
rhetoric. Other authors like Stefano Braghiroli and Andrey Makarychev, take this perspective 
and look into how Russia policy can be aided by their allies in Europe, both the willing, and the 
unwitting ones.35  
In order to find out whether there is an actual security dilemma between the West and 
Russia these angles need to be researched. The problem is though, there is something missing 
in their explanation. Chiefly, they focus primarily on the situation in Europe. In some way this 
gives credence to the notion of Russia being a resurgent power, out to restore their former Soviet 
people. One of the foremost goals of Russian foreign policy is to be a strong and sovereign 
state.36 What most of these authors do not notice is that for Russia itself, its boisterous behaviour 
might endanger the Russian Far East (RFE), in a potential conflict with China. What does it 
mean for Russian sovereignty that they might be able to bully Ukraine, or the Baltics, but they 
lose the Russian Far East? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
34 Pomerantsev, Why we’re post-fact.  
35 Braghiroli & Makarychev, ‘Russia and its supporters in Europe: trans-ideology à la carte?’, 213-233, 
Pomerantsev, ‘The Kremlin’s Information War’ (2015), 40-50. Abrams, ‘Beyond Propaganda: Soviet Active 
Measures in Putin’s Russia’ (2016), 5-31.  
36 Tsygankov, Russian Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity, 29. 
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3.1. Say What Now? 
 
In this section the nature of how Russian rhetoric has shaped Russian foreign policy will be 
discussed, using excerpts from statements by Russian officials, and contrasting those against 
academic literature. This will allow us to examine the ways in which information can be 
transmitted and how it can confuse. This development has problematized the way to sift through 
what is factual, semi-factual, or completely fact free, or as Pomerantsev coined it, post-fact.37 
When using this prism to view Russian rhetoric, a number of points clarify themselves. First, it 
could be argued that Russian policy, and rhetoric is crafted in an environment that is radically 
different from the way EU or NATO policy is crafted. In an interview with Bild magazine, 
President Putin stressed the point that NATO members were not obligated to accept new 
member states, and that this expansion of NATO was one the prime drivers for the current 
tensions, and this could have been avoided if Russia had been able to defend its interests.38 
 What happens in this interview, and this view is prevalent in other statements made by 
Putin, is that a distinct Russian narrative is created. 39 This could probably be best summarised 
as that Russia is justified in defending its own interests, to secure its sovereignty and its position 
as a great power.40 It could be argued that the Russian government is not doing anything 
particular at odds with conventional behaviour. Western countries also construct narratives 
about their actions and motivations when it comes to security matters. An arguable difference 
to that, is that European NATO members joined NATO to strengthen their external security. 
This is arguably even more the case for NATO’s Baltic members.  
 The Russian security narrative, in contrast to Western security narratives, arguably finds 
some fertile soil to plant its seeds in. While this is not the case in mainstream Western academic 
literature, with some notable exceptions, Western media outlets have been susceptible to this 
line of reasoning. These outlets, with a greater reach, have been effective in spreading the 
Russian narrative. If we look at one of the main Russian talking points, namely that NATO 
expansion into Eastern Europe was a deliberate action to curtail post-Soviet Russia is not 
uncommon to hear in public discussion about this subject.41 While there is some evidence to 
suggest that informal agreements were made about limiting NATO expansion with the Soviet 
                                                          
37 Pomerantsev, Why we’re post-fact.  
38 Blome and Diekman, ‘Putin – The Interview’ on http://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/wladimir-putin/russian-
president-vladimir-putin-the-interview-44092656.bild.html.  
39 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts.  
40 Tsygankov, ‘Vladimir Putin’s Vision of Russia as a Normal Great Power’, 134. 
41 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6CBoFmIIjng, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rvwff3Mj2LA, 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-shifrinson-russia-us-nato-deal--20160530-snap-story.html.  
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Union, Russia as the successor state of the Soviet Union signed the NATO-Russia Founding 
Act in 1997, which stated that Russia and NATO would have: 
 
“respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states and their inherent 
right to choose the means to ensure their own security, the inviolability of borders and peoples' 
right of self-determination as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and other OSCE 
documents.”42  
 
This part of the treaty is arguably unambiguous in its wording as to how both NATO and Russia 
ought to behave towards the wishes and actions of countries, who in 1997 were in between the 
two blocs. Russian rhetoric, with President Putin as its main propagator, has created a discourse 
in recent years wherein a seeming plausible notion, NATO expansion as the instigator of 
tensions with Russia, is seen as mainstream in public discourse. It could be argued that this line 
of reasoning is not without merit. If we look at the events after the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, the EU and NATO border moved from Lübeck up to Narva in the space of thirteen 
years. in this time period, if we follow Putin’s rhetoric, the West took advantage of Russian 
weakness to further encapsulate Russia.43 
 Russia it seemed, or was arguably made to look like, a bear that had lost its claws. 
Suffering from slights on its honour, it was only logical that she responded with strength. A 
first sign to this was arguably seen in the five-day war with Georgia. Georgia provoked a 
Russian invasion, or so goes the narrative. Georgian demands about Russian troop withdrawal 
were seen as ungrateful behaviour.44 There is an argument to be made that Georgian actions 
were not beneficial in their approach to Russia. If only for the simple notion that Georgian 
military power collapsed after five days of fighting. An argument against that, is the notion that 
an intervention is inevitable or necessary. Ideally, the use of force is the last resort of state 
power. Only then is it arguably true that war is politics by other means.45 
 This is arguably the danger about this rhetoric. It seems plausible, thereby creating 
doubt, and possibly confusing the broader context of the situation. What if the same rhetoric is 
used to view four thousand NATO troops that are being stationed in the Baltics? While at the 
same time engaging in several large scale military exercises, and building up strength in 
                                                          
42 Founding Act on Mutual Relations.  
43 Putin, Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly December 4 2014.  
44 Tsygankov, Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin: Honor in International Relations, 245. 
45 von Clausewitz, On War (Oxford 1976), 30. 
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Kaliningrad?46 It could be argued that the current atmosphere that surrounds this question of 
placing a limited number semi-permanent NATO forces in the Baltic states is being used as the 
proverbial stick, that stirred the sleeping Russian bear, and that any resulting conflict could be 
cast as a decision made by NATO. Thereby creating an artificial security dilemma that need not 
exist. 
 When discussing how rhetoric can frame a political discourse, it is useful to see how 
effective it can be. This process has been described in detail by scholars like Wæver and Barry 
Buzan.47 This has led to a blurring of intentions which is another facet that adds uncertainty to 
an already tense situation. It could be argued that this is intentional policy for the Kremlin. 
Create just enough uncertainty, and confusion so that your freedom to take action is 
undiminished. Leading to a situation whereby Russia remains the party with the strategical 
initiative, with the EU and NATO reacting to every step. Although, it could just as well be 
argued that President Putin is taking advantage of the relative chaos that harries the United 
States and the EU. Both are, at the moment, distracted by internal troubles, brought on in part 
by nationalist movements. From Putin’s perspective, this presents a golden opportunity to 
exploit. If we view all this through securitisation theory, we see that this discourse can arguably 
be seen as an example of how discourse can create a security dilemma 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
46 Samuels, ‘Russia gathers troops at Baltic military bases ahead of Cold War-style stand-off with Nato’ in The 
Independent (5 July 2016).  
47 Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde. Security: a new framework for analysis. 
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3.2. The Bear and Its Stick 
 
With the current discourse on Russian rhetoric as described above, the material power behind 
that rhetoric tends to get overlooked, this will be discussed now. A threat can in essence only 
be a threat if there is a material power behind it. That material aspect will be discussed in this 
section. The Soviet Union has on occasion been described as a giant on clay feet.48 Yet, the 
spectre of a Soviet invasion, which birthed NATO, was the one aspect that arguably dominated 
the geopolitical thinking in Europe during the Cold War. However, when the Soviet Union 
collapsed, so too did the Soviet Army. Its last convulsion was an act of internal revolt against 
the administration of Mikhail Gorbachov, which arguably signalled both its demise, and its 
weakness. Its decline, in the form of its successor as the Russian army, continued in the wake 
of budget cuts, and liberalisation of Russian industry. When it was sent into Chechnya in 1994, 
it was defeated by Chechen insurgents, and was forced to withdraw in humiliation.  
 This humiliation was further compounded when NATO forces engaged with Serbia to 
stop the ethnic cleansing that was taking place in Kosovo.49 At the same time Vladimir Putin 
came to the fore of Russian politics, being the eventual successor of President Boris Yeltsin. 
Putin was committed to rebuild Russia, and its former stature as a great power.50 At first this 
was tried through economic policies, and even cooperation with NATO and the United States 
in the context of the War on Terror. This situation did not last. In 2005, President Putin 
remarked about the disaster of the Soviet collapse, and in 2007 he positioned an arguably more 
assertive stance on the international stage.51 This new assertiveness was demonstrated when in 
the summer of 2008, Russian forces invaded South Ossetia, ostensibly as an ‘peace enforcement 
operation’. In five days, the Russian army were unopposed, and only American pressure on 
Russia halted their advance.52 
 Although the Georgian campaign was an operational success, it was not without its own 
difficulties.53 Russian military expenditure was duly increased to undercut this deficiency, and 
what is arguably interesting is that in the period between 2008 and 2015, the amount of money 
the Russian government spend on defence rose to 5% of Russia’s gross domestic product.54 One 
                                                          
48 Gatrell, ‘Feet of Clay? The Soviet Economic Giant in Recent Historiography’, 299-315. 
49 Arbatov, The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya, 1-3.  
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Legitimacy and Goals’, 404-405. 
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of the reasons why this is a relative high number, is that Russia’s GDP has shrunk 
considerably.55 
This has led to a Russian army that, on paper at least, looks formidable. In comparison 
to what most NATO countries can bring to the fore, this military power gives the Russian 
military a considerable bite, to complement the bark coming from the Kremlin.56 It is also a 
policy instrument that the Kremlin is not afraid to use. The number of military exercises have 
increased in recent years. including one exercise that involved 150.000 soldiers near the Baltic 
states.57 It could be argued that Russian sabre rattling is a show of strength, however this could 
arguably be a front to hide weakness. 
 Whether or not Russian sabre rattling is a front for weakness, its army still is supported 
by a considerable arsenal, and has several other advantages to support its rhetoric. To clarify, a 
military exercise, regardless of size, is not necessarily a signal for an invasion, but if we link 
this to Russian rhetoric, it represents rhetoric made physical. Arguably the biggest of these is 
the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. It was turned into an armed outpost, after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, Kaliningrad remained a relic of the past, being surrounded by Poland and 
Lithuania. Kaliningrad’s position is problematic in the current security situation for the Baltics. 
Should hostilities break out, Kaliningrad can arguably be a staging point for the Russian ground 
forces, and be used to close of the Baltic Sea for NATO ships and planes.  
If we look at the position of the Kaliningrad exclave, it could be argued that the 
annexation of East Prussia was a sign of foresight on behalf of the Soviet Union. While it is 
arguably more likely that this annexation was an act of revenge, to destroy Prussian 
militarism.58 None the less, in a constructed Russian reality wherein NATO is the prime 
adversary, having this heavily armed outpost serves as a useful policy tool. One other 
advantage, is what is called is the Suwalki Gap.59 This refers to the ninety-six-kilometre gap 
between Kaliningrad and Belorussia, which can be sealed off in the case of war. Isolating the 
Baltic states from land, and sea. The Suwalki Gap has become a matter of great concern NATO 
military planners.60  
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While an actual armed conflict is arguably unlikely, concerns remain. For in the case of 
an armed conflict, one of the problems that will face NATO forces is reaching the Baltics in the 
first place. In recent years, the fruits of Russian military expenditure have resulted in an 
advanced anti-access and area denial weaponry, which are placed at strategic choke points, 
including in Kaliningrad.61 Arguably, in a worst-case scenario, these assets can cut off the Baltic 
states, while Russian forces drive into the Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania, and occupy it. The 
NATO forces in the area, will likely be overwhelmed in the invasion. These scenarios can be 
just scenarios, and they are arguably unlikely to happen, a full scale military invasion by 
Russian forces will trigger an armed conflict with NATO. 
President Theodore Roosevelt once remarked that in foreign policy it is preferable to 
‘speak softly and carry a big stick’.62 While it might be argued that Russian behaviour is not 
adhering to the first part, actions both in military exercises and military build-up have shown 
that President Putin is willing to flex his muscles, and wave his big stick for all to see. What is 
arguably shown through Russian actions, is that the maxim of Thucydides, that might makes 
right,63 is still prevalent within the Kremlin. However, if the seminal work of Thucydides can 
be used as a useful tool for international relations issues, this maxim comes at a cost. Chiefly, 
that maintaining the notion of might makes right can become the origin of one’s own downfall. 
While Russian military build-up in the recent years has worried NATO commanders, there are 
signs that these worries are overdrawn. Russian military spending is higher than any individual 
European countries, but the current NATO defence spending, excluding North-American 
defence spending, dwarves the Russian budget.64 If we look at this aspect of Russian foreign 
policy through the PDA method, this combination of rhetoric and deliberate policy decisions 
offer a clearer picture as to how the current security dilemma came into being. The combination 
of a sense of indignation from Russian policy makers, combined with the necessary means gives 
power to that indignation.  
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3.3.    Looking to the West 
 
Looking back at the previous sections, we can see the way in which Russian rhetoric has been 
strengthened by the use of Russian military muscle to further the goals of the Kremlin. In this 
section we will look at the Baltic states and their drive towards integration with the West and 
how this came to be, and how this process has contributed to the current situation. The Baltic 
states got their first start as independent countries after Germany and the Soviet Union signed 
the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk these countries were first under the influence of Germany. The 
German protection allowed these countries to free themselves from Russian domination. When 
war came in 1940 however, after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact divided Eastern and Central 
Europe, the Soviet occupation came quick.65 
 While there was armed resistance against the Soviet occupation, it was eventually 
suppressed by heavy handed Soviet policies, including deportation.66 The term occupation in 
this context is a reflection of how the Baltic states view their time as Soviet republics.67 The 
term occupation is a heated term to use, but in this context it helps to clarify in part, why the 
Baltic states looked westward, when they regained their independence. What is arguably also 
important in this context is that the independence of the Baltic states was in part achieved by 
Soviet, and later Russian, non-intervention and withdrawal. This notion is also important to 
remember, the independence of the Baltic states could have been obstructed had the Soviet 
Union, or Russia denied any claims of independence. What has to be remembered is that these 
decisions were consciously made, which might in part explain the current tensions.  
In the NATO-Russia Founding Act, both Russia and the NATO members agreed to 
respect the former Warsaw Pact countries, and former Soviet Republics, rights to arrange their 
own security environment. With the exception of Ukraine, Belarus, most of these countries 
steered a pro-Western course, both for EU, and NATO membership, in an effort to shed the 
spectre of future Russian domination. The membership drive for both the EU, and arguably 
even more so for NATO, can be understood in these terms. NATO’s Article 5, served as the 
prime incentive for the Baltic states to shore up their external security. The memory of Soviet 
occupation, served as a reminder of their vulnerability. While Baltic concerns on this point are 
arguably valid, they do form a security discourse. Whereby Russia is viewed as a possible 
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aggressor.68 This view has been reinforced by the events that happened in Ukraine after the 
Euromaidan protests.69 This view is not without its merit, the rapid annexation of Crimea points 
to an action which was well prepared in advance, a well prepared action, which Russian rhetoric 
provided the justification for. 
 There are however, problematic issues with this discourse. Discourses can have real life 
consequences. Firstly, the notion of a monolithic Russian other is quite problematic in the case 
of the Baltic states. As mentioned before, the Baltic peoples suffered deportation of the ethnic 
inhabitants. Similar to other non-Russian populations in the Soviet Union. Those areas were 
partly repopulated with ethnic Russians, most of which stayed after independence. The effects 
of these policies are most prescient in Estonia, and Latvia, where just under thirty percent of 
the population can be classified as ethnic Russians.70 A discourse that focuses primarily on 
seeing Russia as a potential enemy, runs the risk of potentially alienating the ethnic Russian 
living in the Baltics. 
 When the Baltic states regained their independence, the Soviet settlement policy was a 
source of tensions between the newly independent states, and its Russian minorities, especially 
where it concerned the history of World War Two.71 This was partly due to the way these 
countries reconstituted their independent states, as continuations of their period of 
independence from 1918 to 1940, and the focus on ethnic nationalism.72 Oddly enough, it was 
the path towards EU membership that mitigated these policies. The Copenhagen Criteria 
mentions explicitly that the rights of ethnic minorities need to be respected and protected.73 The 
way in which the Baltic states treat their Russian minorities differs. In general, the Russian 
minorities are economically better off in the Baltic states. When it comes to social integration 
into Baltic society there are some notable differences.74 
 One of the scenarios that worries Baltic, and also Western politicians, is that Russia 
might be tempted to engage in the same tactics they used in Ukraine. By stoking ethnic tensions 
between Russians on the one hand, and Estonians, Latvians, or Lithuanians on the other side. 
Giving the Kremlin a pretext to intervene, and ‘protect compatriots’. There are, in contrast to 
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this military scenario other non-military actions that can be undertaken by a foreign power. This 
is in part what Russia’s current military doctrine, named after Russian Chief of Staff Vassily 
Gerasimov, foresees in.75 One example that is used as a hypothetical target is the border city of 
Narva. Its population is largely ethnically Russian, and therefore arguably susceptible to 
possible Russian agitation.76 There is a debate on whether or not this is a potential flash point77, 
the conditions for Russian intervention in Ukraine were arguably ideal. Taking advantage of a 
country in chaos, whose governance structure is thoroughly corrupt is one thing. Trying to do 
the same in country which has a reputation of stable and good governance, is arguably more 
difficult. 
 When we are discussing whether or not there exists a security dilemma between Russia 
and West in the Baltics, we need to remember that this is a concept promoted by (neo)-Realist 
scholars. But to paraphrase Alexander Wendt,78 a dilemma is what you make of it. It could be 
argued that Russian rhetoric is a sign of weakness. The recent years have brought a new wave 
of repression in Russia, which harkens back to the Soviet Union.79 The internal message given 
to the Russian people arguably borders on the hysterical, wherein their very lives are at risk. 
This internal rhetoric arguably relates to the way Russian foreign policy responses are 
advocated abroad. In this way, four rotating NATO battalions in the Baltics, can used to whip 
up nationalistic fervour, to shore up executive power in the Kremlin, and more specifically, 
around President Putin. 
 This can arguably be seen as a construct that is being reinforced, a continuous cycle that 
in part due to near total government control of media outlets. This momentum arguably has 
something problematic about it. If the overarching narrative in Russia is that the West is an 
existential threat to Russian lives, and its imagined Russkiy Mir80, any compromise between the 
West, and Russia about Ukraine, or a drawdown of military forces around the Baltic Sea area, 
will arguably be difficult to reach. If it was just rhetoric, this could be arguably being overcome, 
however, there are signs that there is a level of sincerity to this rhetoric.81 It could be argued 
that therein lies the main problematic issue in Russian and Western relations. Due to perceived 
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internal weakness, a situation has been constructed which has polarised Russian society against 
‘The West’, and arguably has given Russian policy makers licence to renege on any form of 
compromise.   
 Just as this kind of rhetoric can arguably have real life consequences on foreign policy 
issues, including war, those issues in themselves have consequences as well. If this constructed 
security dilemma spills over into a military conflict in the Baltics, and the occupation thereof 
by Russia, there are issues which the occupier needs to keep in mind. Firstly, there is a sizeable 
area that needs to be kept under permanent occupation. Inferring additional costs, both 
monetary, and personnel. Second, the Baltic states have enjoyed twenty-five years of 
independence, what happens when they, like their predecessors take up armed resistance? There 
is also the point that a Russian invasion of the Baltic would arguably give a clear choice to 
Western politicians to stop viewing Russia as a ‘normal’ country within the international 
community? Are these consequences enough of an inhibiting factor though? 
 There are also other arguments which point to a peaceful solution of this security 
dilemma. The first option, which might sounds counter intuitive, are the policies adopted by 
NATO after the summits in Wales, and Warsaw. The most prominent of these is the NATO 
Readiness Action Plan (RAP). Which outlined the formation of permanent rotating military 
units in Eastern Europe.82 The number of these troops is limited, four battalions, four thousand 
soldiers in total. The question this arguably beckons, is whether or not if these units are enough 
of a deterrent for any possible attacks? Russian military exercises muster on average ten times 
that number, but sabre rattling, and attacking NATO forces are two different beasts, and these 
forces might pose as a credible deterrent. 
 The placing of these troops in of itself might not seem as a credible deterrent, to bolster 
these troops, NATO members agreed to the formation of a NATO Response Force (NRF), and 
a spearhead force, the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF).83 The NRF is a force that 
consists of forty thousand troops which can be mobilised to act in case of emergency, the VJTF 
can be mobilised and transported within forty-eight hours to any crisis area. There are however, 
a number questions about its effectiveness. Firstly, can it be mobilised in time to respond against 
Russian aggression in the Baltics. With Kaliningrad as a weaponised outpost in the Baltic Sea, 
this area can quickly be permanently closed off to NATO troop movements.   
 There is also another aspect of geo-politics that has been overlooked in this current 
situation, and that is the Russian Far East (RFE). In this area, which in large parts was annexed 
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from the Qing Empire, Chinese migrants, and businesses are economically colonising the 
Siberian mineral wealth. In addition to this development, Chinese demographic pressures in 
this sparsely population region are becoming a possible source of future tensions.84 At this 
moment in time, the majority of investments comes from China due to the sanctions levied by 
the EU, and the US, which limits their ability to compete for investments. Considering the 
history of the region, and recent Chinese assertiveness, it could be argued that it might be a 
matter of time before the Russian Far East becomes the Chinese North East. 
 One of the main principles informing Russian foreign policy is that Russia must be able 
to act independent, and sovereign. To protect the Russian state, its people, and its interests.85 
This vision can arguably be clearly be seen played out within the European context. In this 
context, these principles are seemingly uncompromising. Seeing this hardened stance, it is 
difficult to rhyme this behaviour with their stance towards the growing Chinese influence in the 
RFE, which arguably could be the bigger threat to Russian sovereignty than NATO. One 
plausible explanation for this is that the Russian economy, hit by economic sanctions is in need 
of currency. It could be argued that the need for Chinese investors supersedes Russian 
sovereignty and honour, allowing the Kremlin to keep up appearances in Europe. 
 There is an argument to be made that waiting for a conflict between China and Russia 
is not an ideal solution to solving a security dilemma. There are however, other ways dealing 
with Russia, one model is that of Finland, which manages to keep friendly relations with Russia, 
which Foreign Policy dubbed as Bear Whispering, although others prefer calling it 
appeasement.86 This Finnish stance however, is backed up by an arguably sensible military 
policy of the Finnish government. It could be argued, that this holds a solution in dealing with 
Russia. Russia under Putin, is not a ‘regular’ European country, in the sense that it adheres to 
Western political conventions. Russia does understand power politics, maybe it is time we do 
the same.  
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Conclusion 
 
Rhetoric can be a powerful asset in a foreign policy toolkit. It can be used to create a position 
of moral authority. In the same manner, it can be used to create an atmosphere of fear, 
insecurity, or even terror. In the case of a possible security dilemma between Russia and the 
West, the use of rhetoric can have great consequences. This Russian rhetoric about imagined 
injustices towards Russia however, stands in stark contrast to not just history, but also 
international law. International agreements, like the NATO-Russia Founding Act or the 
Budapest Memorandums on Security Assurances of 199487 obligated both Russia and the West 
to the territorial integrity of states in a post-Cold War Europe. In the current situation however, 
it looks like the truth became irrelevant. 
 Rhetoric alone however, cannot in of itself cause a security dilemma. It can inform 
actions, and behaviour, but it is the strength behind rhetoric that gives it power. If we look at 
this case study, the giant stick behind the harsh words, is the Russian military. With its strategic 
outpost at Kaliningrad, able to block off the Baltic Sea for NATO troop movements. Regular, 
and large scale military exercises in the Russian Western Military District. While the intent of 
these actions are oblique, they point to a new aggressive, and assertive stance of Russian foreign 
policy. This behaviour is not without its consequences, there are signs that European NATO 
members are increasing military expenditures, and NATO is slowly readjusting to its initial 
goal of deterring Russia. 
 To the Baltic states, this is one of their primary foreign policy goals. Their history has 
been marked by domination, independence, war, occupation, and renewed independence. While 
an armed military conflict in the Baltics is unlikely at this moment. Russian sabre rattling has 
given Baltic politicians, whether correct or incorrect, the idea that their independence is, 
potentially, conditional as it stands. A further threat, although in case of the Baltics unlikely, 
but not impossible, is that of hybrid war, the kind we have seen used in Ukraine. Estonia, and 
Latvia both have large Russian minorities. These are economically better off than in Russia, 
and are arguably unlikely to actively assist Russian provocateurs, but their status as fully 
fledged citizens of the Baltic states, is still an issue that is not fully resolved. Leaving a potential 
Russian hybrid campaign potential room to manoeuvre. 
 When discussing whether or not there is a security dilemma, it needs to be remembered 
that an idea like a security dilemma is a constructed situation. To reiterate, a dilemma is what 
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you make of it. While it is arguable which side can create a security dilemma, both sides 
maintain, and expand on it. Both sides may even prefer a security dilemma as to further their 
own domestic agendas. In some ways, the primary goal for the Baltic states, independence, is 
now a concern for NATO, which has placed rotating battalions as a sign of deterrence. For 
Russia, maintaining the current situation allows the Kremlin to restructure and enhance its own 
domestic power to stifle popular dissent. There can be however, a way out of this dilemma. 
Firstly, should it be the case that a Russian invasion of the Baltics takes place, it might well 
succeed in its purpose. This would mean that those Baltic states need to be occupied by Russian 
forces. Straining an already tight Russian budget. A second possible de-escalating factor could 
be that the real threat for Russia is likelier to show itself in the Russian Far East. If Chinese 
economic influence there continues to grow, this resource rich area might become the Chinese 
North East. For a country like Russia, that prides itself as a country which is sovereign and 
strong, this would be worse than three independent Baltic states.  
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